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‘Best of both worlds’? A comparison of third sector providers in 
health care and welfare-to-work markets in Britain 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper compares the welfare markets in primary health care and ‘welfare-to-
work’ in the UK since the late 1990s. A longitudinal comparison of two different 
policy areas enables us to study the context in which marketization and the resulting 
shift of welfare provision takes place. We will outline the general background of the 
market-based reforms and highlight in what way policy makers have ascribed third 
sector organizations a number of positive characteristics, particularly the ability to 
address concerns about well-known market failures. While consecutive governments 
promoted these organizations as welfare providers, case studies of two illustrative 
provider organizations in each policy area reveal a number of problems regarding 
their distinctiveness in increasingly competitive welfare markets.  
 
We conclude that the crisp distinction made by policy makers between the third and 
other sectors as well as the alleged advantages of the former present a rather naïve 
picture of a complex reality and argue for a more critical view of third sector 
characteristics and performance. The third sector is not only characterized by a high 
degree of fuzziness at the boundaries to other sectors, but even within single 
organizations who often undergo significant transformations over time. As a result, 
policy intentions and practical outcomes are contradictory with third sector 
organizations losing their alleged distinctiveness as players in increasingly 
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competitive markets. Furthermore, we contend that detailed longitudinal studies of 
organizations are essential in the advancement of the discussion of the third sector 
concept as they provide conceptual insights into organizational change and behaviour.  
 
Key Words: Third sector; welfare markets; hybridization; public sector reform; 
primary care; welfare-to-work 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
We would like to acknowledge the support of this research by The Wise Group.  
Some of this research was funded via an ESRC case-studentship (grant 
number ES/F032021/1).  
 
 3 
Introduction  
 
The use of independent providers governed through contractual agreements is an 
essential aspect of the creation of new welfare markets for the delivery of public 
services. This paper aims to identify the developments of service provision across two 
new welfare markets in the UK with a particular focus on third sector organizations 
(TSOs). There is still little comparative research on the new welfare providers, 
particularly in cross-sector perspective and over time. To capture the complexity of 
variation in this area, we compare the emerging welfare markets and TSOs in primary 
care (i.e. health care traditionally delivered by GPs) and ‘welfare-to-work’ (also 
known as ‘activation’) policies. Analysing the development of particular provider 
forms across policy areas may help to better understand processes of ongoing change 
and to challenge some of the rather naïve assumptions of policy makers about the 
distinct characteristics of different types of providers such as TSOs. We draw on and 
contribute to conceptual discussions in the third sector literature to explore the reality 
of TSOs in welfare markets. The aim here is to focus on identifying how ideas about 
the third sector are mobilized in welfare policies and then to consider the development 
of TSOs in different contexts.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. First, we situate the emergence of markets in health 
care and welfare-to-work into a wider trend towards more competition and provider 
diversity within public welfare in the theoretical context of both ‘government failure’ 
and ‘market failure’. Second, we present legislative and policy changes that led to 
increased provider diversity both in primary care and activation. Through two case 
studies of providers operating in these welfare markets we then shed some light on the 
extent of their activities and complexity of their organizations pointing to problems 
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that arise when classifying individual providers. In our following discussion we 
contend that we find a process of hybridization not only across sectors but even within 
organizations in which the boundaries between public and private become 
increasingly blurred and sometimes are clearly crossed in the course of time. In line 
with the literature on the hybridization of TSOs (that is widely ignored by policy 
makers who rely too much on a demarcated sector based understanding of TSOs) we 
conclude that it is very difficult to even classify many of the new provider 
organizations into a simple typology of public, private or third sector, let alone to 
generalize any of their alleged characteristics and outcomes across such a wide and 
ill-defined sector. The tendencies in both markets to favour larger, for-profit providers 
has had various effects on the organizational behaviour and performance of TSOs and 
led to significant change within organizations in the long run.  
 
 
Welfare markets and third sector providers 
 
Despite the post-war UK welfare state usually being classified as a liberal regime type 
(Esping-Andersen 1990), trends of marketization involving the contracting of services 
via competitive tendering processes and privatization involving the use of non-public 
sector actors have become a relevant phenomenon only since the late 1990s in both 
the field of health care and activation (Mays et al. 2011; Larsen and Wright 2014). 
Influenced by ‘New Public Management’ (NPM) ideas, private sector management 
styles have been introduced in an effort to counter so-called ‘government failure’ and 
perceptions of public sector inefficiency, unresponsiveness to consumers, and 
complacency due to the lack of competition. The NPM doctrine comprises the 
introduction of explicit performance standards and measurement, a focus on results 
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instead of processes, and the disaggregation of public sector units and services in 
order to achieve competition and more efficient resource use (Hood 1991; Domberger 
and Jensen 1997). One mechanism for achieving greater competition is to increase the 
diversity of providers by facilitating the delivery of public services through the private 
sector or through the creation of quasi-markets (Le Grand and Bartlett, 1993). 
 
Concerns have, however, also been raised regarding problems of ‘market failure’ 
related to the provision of key welfare services by private organizations and 
marketization processes have faced criticisms regarding issues of service delivery and 
equality. In relation to health care and activation services most serious is the risk that 
providers engage in quality-shirking or selection bias favouring low-risk/high-profit 
cases in their pursuit of profit-maximisation (so called ‘cherry picking’ or ‘cream-
skimming’) (Koning and Heinrich 2013).  
 
Since the 1990s consecutive UK governments have supported a variety of mixed 
public-private bodies and TSOs as potential providers of welfare services as an 
alternative to the state and the market in an attempt to promote welfare pluralism 
(Alcock 2010). While TSOs are seen as innovators just as other entrepreneurs, these 
organizations are supposed to have the added advantage of instilling trust in their 
business conduct due to their defining non-distribution constraint and ‘social mission’ 
(Hansmann 1980). The issue of trust is pivotal in welfare markets that are 
characterized by significant information asymmetries between providers and 
consumers or purchasers, i.e. under conditions where there is the possibility that 
profit-oriented firms would decrease quality, charge inflated prices for simple services 
or prescribe unnecessarily expensive treatments or programmes in order to increase 
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manager salaries or dividends for shareholders (Toepfler and Anheier 2010). The 
notion that TSOs act differently to private and public sector providers is therefore an 
important facet of government rhetoric and its justification for the market based 
reforms of key welfare services. However, Damm (2012: 21) recently identified the 
‘dearth of more basic, descriptive data’ and stated that ‘[t]oo little is known about the 
third sector organisations that are involved in [welfare-to-work] delivery, and those 
who are not, either through their own choice or having failed to win any contracts’. In 
part this reflects the limited availability of academic research that has considered the 
reality of TSO characteristics and behaviours, or the issues of organizational change 
in these new welfare governance arrangements. This paper seeks to address such 
deficiencies. 
 
 
Defining and delineating the third sector 
 
The concept of the ‘third sector’ is utilized in both policy and academic literature with 
a general acceptance that TSOs occupy a space between the public and the private for-
profit sector – hence their label ‘third sector’.  
As the academic literature has shown, in reality it is an ill-defined and imprecise term 
and the exact boundaries between the third sector and other sectors in the MEW are in 
practice difficult to determine. Evers and Laville (2004) spoke of a ‘tension field’ 
while Billis (2010) problematized the ‘hybridity’ resulting from the overlap of the 
sectors that constitute the MEW. Similarly, Brandsen et al. (2005; 750) contend that 
the impression of demarcated sectors do not hold up empirically where ‘it is far easier 
to find arrangements that are hybrid or “fuzzy” than those approximating ideal types.’ 
They propose that we understand hybridity and change as one of the defining features 
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of the concept of the third sector and draw on the metaphors of a griffin and 
chameleon to describe the existence of organizations whose nature is based on a 
combination of unexpected parts or where change is an essential and distinguishing 
characteristic. Partly this is due to some organizations changing motivations and goals 
over time, but partly also due to organizations crossing the boundary between the 
third and private sector (Westall 2009). This problem is exacerbated by the diversity 
in form and function and the lack of a clear definition of the third sector (Kendall and 
Knapp 1995; Salamon and Anheier 1997). 
 
While conceptual discussions of the third sector are rife in the academic literature, 
government rhetoric is comparatively more pragmatic. On the one hand, government 
rhetoric all too often employs a language of a crisp distinction between the public, 
private and third sector. On the other hand, it also acknowledges and praises the 
diversity of organizations that comprise the third sector and the contribution they can 
bring to improve the new welfare markets (HM Treasury 2004a and 2004b; Cabinet 
Office 2011).  
 
Government policy uses the term ‘third sector’  in a perhaps deliberately vague 
fashion in order to claim that they were addressing various social problems using new 
providers (Teasdale 2011).However, demarking the sector from private firms has 
become even harder since the government subsumed so-called social enterprises 
under the third sector banner (Westall 2009). As there is no specific legal form for 
social enterprises these can vary from registered charities to private limited companies 
and may refer to ‘local community enterprises, social firms, mutual organisations 
such as co-operatives, and large-scale organisations operating nationally or 
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internationally’ (DTI 2002: 7). The Cabinet Office (2011: 12) defined social 
enterprises as profit-making businesses, but which principally invest their profits into 
a social purpose (our accentuation) rather than private reward, although they can pay 
a dividend to their shareholders or directors. The ambiguous prefix ‘social’ refers to a 
variety of things, such as local ownership, regeneration, combating forms of 
disadvantage, environmental or cultural values or simply to public service delivery 
(DTI 2002; Westall 2009).  
 
 
The promotion of TSOs in UK Government rhetoric 
 
Despite the definitional complexities, the postulation that the third sector represents 
‘the best of both worlds’ by combining the efficiency, quality and innovativeness 
typically ascribed to the private sector with the social responsibility that should be 
guiding the public sector became popular in the context of New Labour’s ‘Third Way’ 
reforms since 1997. In addition, the third sector was seen as having comparative 
advantages over both sectors through its strengths in relation to ‘empowering users 
and promoting community engagement’ and their ‘personalised approach and public 
trust’ (Office of the Third Sector 2006: 9). The fostering of the third sector as ‘a key 
partner in delivering government policies’ and public service provision was driven 
across government departments in the early 2000s through a number of Treasury 
reports (HM Treasury 2002:5; 2004a; 2004b). An amendment to the Companies Act 
in 2005 introduced a new corporate form called ‘Community Interest Company’ 
(CIC), designed for use by social enterprises wishing to contract for public services. 
In 2006, an Office of the Third Sector was created in the Cabinet Office with a 
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Minister responsible for charities, social enterprises and voluntary organizations. 
Social enterprises were promoted on the premise that there need not be a conflict 
between creating an inclusive society and encouraging entrepreneurship (DTI 2002: 
6), i.e. between ‘doing good’ and ‘doing well’.  
 
 There are some notable differences between the Labour government’s promotion of 
the third sector and the Conservative-led Coalition’s policy approach (see Macmillan, 
2011). However, there is a continuation of third sector involvement within the context 
of public service outsourcing and the new government remained committed to 
strengthening TSOs. For example, the ‘Big Society bank’ Big Society Capital was 
installed with £600 million in April 2012 and in February 2013 an ‘Investment 
Readiness Programme’ worth £20 million was set up (Cabinet Office 2013).  
The Coalition government continues to convey the impression that it supports the 
involvement of all types of organizations in public sector outsourcing and contracting, 
and actively seeks to remove barriers to involvement ‘so that a diverse range of 
providers can deliver the public services people want, ensuring a truly level playing 
field between the public, private and voluntary sectors’ (HM Government 2011: 9). 
This active promotion of the third sector as a provider of public services was mirrored 
at departmental level as the following sections will show.  
 
2. Legislative changes and programmes to support the third sector in 
primary care and welfare-to-work 
 
2.1 Changes in the provision of primary care  
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The NHS and Community Care Act 1990 introduced a range of market mechanisms, 
including the outsourcing of a number of public services, and a certain extent of 
competition into the NHS. In accordance with NPM principles, a purchaser-provider 
split was introduced by dividing the NHS into autonomous sub-units who trade with 
each other in an internal market.  
 
While the incoming New Labour government in 1997 abolished this quasi-market, the 
split between NHS purchasers and providers remained as newly created local arms of 
the Department of Health (Primary Care Trusts, PCTs) commissioned care from NHS 
providers. However, the government also announced its intention to develop 
partnerships with the voluntary sector for the provision of health care services in an 
attempt to meet newly set targets of increased accessibility and choice and a shift 
from secondary to primary care (Department of Health 2000). This was followed by a 
number of legislative reforms that ended the public sector’s monopoly in primary care 
as well as initiatives designed to remove barriers for private companies and TSOs into 
the new primary medical care market (see table 1). 
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Table 1: Primary care market reforms 1998-2013 
Phase Reform Key change Providers Features 
1997-
2003 
Primary  Care Act 
1997  
Introduction of 
Personal Medical 
Services (PMS) 
NHS 
providers  
Locally agreed alternative to 
General Medical Service for 
specific populations 
2004-
2007 
New General 
Medical Services 
(GMS) Contract 
Fragmentation of 
range of services 
to be offered by 
GPs and 
introduction of 
new contract 
forms (PCTMS, 
APMS) in 
addition to GMS 
and PMS 
NHS GPs and 
non-NHS 
‘Alternative 
Providers’    
APMS provides the 
opportunity for locally 
negotiated contracts with 
non-NHS bodies, such as 
voluntary or commercial 
sector providers (or with 
GMS/PMS practices) to 
supply enhanced and 
additional primary medical 
services 
2008-
2010 
Equitable Access to 
Primary Care 
Introduction of at 
least 100 new 
general practices 
in the 25% of 
areas with the 
poorest provision 
and 151 GP-led 
health centres 
NHS GPs and 
non-NHS 
providers 
APMS as the recommended 
contracting route, boosting 
private sector providers 
2010- Health and Social 
Care Bill [Health 
and Social Care Act 
2012] 
All GP contracts 
decided by 
competitive 
tendering process. 
GPs gaining 
control over 
commissioning of 
non-primary care 
services 
‘Any willing 
provider’ 
(later on ‘any 
qualified 
provider’) 
Break-up of former nationally 
standardised GMS. Increased 
choice for patients and 
competition amongst 
providers. 
 
Each reform involved an increasing potential for competition for primary care 
contracts from outside the NHS. 
 
New GMS contract  
 
The new General Medical Services (GMS) contract in 2004 provided for greater 
flexibility in the range of services delivered by fragmenting the contract into a limited 
‘essential’ service that can be topped up with locally negotiated ‘additional’ and 
‘enhanced’ elements, e.g. specialist services formerly provided in hospitals, 
 12 
immunisation services, etc., allowing PCTs to be more sensitive to their local 
population’s health needs while offering an entry point into primary care for new 
providers (Pollock and Price 2006). Another major market opportunity for the private 
sector and so-called ‘GP entrepreneurs’ arose from the separation of out-of-hours 
services, that is, GP service cover outside regular surgery opening times.  
 
This break-up of the GP’s monopoly of providing NHS care and the fragmentation of 
primary care services into different components has to be seen in the context of 
growing concerns about so-called ‘under-doctored’ areas (referring to often deprived 
areas where it was hard to persuade GPs to work, resulting in an increased burden on 
secondary care) and that existing contracts were inadequate for achieving ambitious 
NHS targets (Department of Health 2007; 2008). At the same time, GPs were 
increasingly frustrated about their workload including their evening and weekend 
hours (Heins and Parry 2011).  
 
The emergence of new providers of primary care has furthermore been enabled by the 
introduction of three new contract forms in addition to the standard GMS contract. 
Relevant for increasing provider diversity and enabling primary care ‘entrepreneurs’ 
to enter the new market was the Alternative Provider Medical Services (APMS) 
contract form. Commissioned through competitive tendering processes and regulated 
through individual contracts between the PCT and provider, APMS permits primary 
care services to be delivered in a flexible way by a wider range of providers than NHS 
doctors, including the independent sector, voluntary sector, CICs, and social 
enterprises (Pollock and Price 2006; Pollock et al. 2007; Heins et al. 2009).  
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Programmes to foster the diversity of primary care providers 
 
While believing in the advantages of competition and provider diversity, the 
government remained somewhat hesitant regarding the role of for-profit health care 
companies. Hence they tried to extend the diversity of providers by supporting 
organizations such as CICs or social enterprises in health and social care (Department 
of Health 2006; Third Sector Commissioning Task Force 2006) ‘to ensure a patient-
centred service’ (Department of Health 2000: 5). In addition, a number of Department 
of Health programmes offered significant extra investment into primary care to 
support the entry of new providers (Department of Health 2005; 2007). The aim was 
to achieve ‘a level playing field’ for these organisations in the face of competition 
from the established NHS providers and much larger and commercially more 
experienced for-profit health care providers (Department of Health 2006: 175-176).  
 
The launch of the Equitable Access to Primary Medical Care (EAPMC) programme 
represented the biggest opportunity for social enterprises in primary care. The aim 
was to set up at least 100 new surgeries in the 25 per cent PCTs with the poorest 
provision in addition to one GP-led health centre in each PCT. The Department of 
Health (2008) recommended the use of APMS contracts as the preferred contracting 
route for EAPMC procurements, thus enabling competition for these new contracts 
among providers from different sectors and emphasized the potential for ‘GP 
entrepreneurs’ to submit innovative tenders.  
 
The Social Enterprise Investment Fund (SEIF), set up in 2007, has been the most 
important funding source for TSOs in health care. SEIF continues to provide capital 
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for start-ups and already running social enterprises also under the Coalition 
government (Miller and Millar 2011). In addition, under the ‘Right to Provide’ 
scheme, public sector workers in the NHS are given the opportunity to form 
employee-owned or joint-venture based mutuals, co-operatives or social enterprises to 
deliver public services (HM Government 2011). The aim is ‘to create the largest 
social enterprise sector in the world’ (Department of Health 2010: 5). 
 
The potential for non-public sector organizations to provide tax-funded primary care 
services has increased dramatically with the passing of the Health and Social Care 
2012 Act. The new NHS Commissioning Board is authorized to arrange contracts 
with ‘any qualified provider’ that meets NHS standards and prices and health, in other 
words, the previously rather exceptional use of competitive tenders under APMS has 
been rolled out widely (Heins 2013). As a consequence, it has been estimated that a 
£20bn opportunity for private companies is opening up (Catalyst Corporate Finance 
2012).  
 
2.2. Changes in the provision of activation  
 
In the late 1990s the Labour government introduced the ‘New Deal’ welfare-to-work 
programmes that aimed to provide jobseekers with employment assistance after a 
certain period of unemployment (Finn 2011). Unlike previous national activation 
programmes the government created contractual relationships with non-public sector 
organizations and moved the delivery of services away from the public employment 
service and towards a marketized system. Key features of this new welfare-to-work 
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market included payment by results, provider competition pre and post contract, and 
more recently a reduction in regulation and state prescription of activities.   
 
As part of the rationale for contracting outside of the public sector the virtues of both 
the financial management and flexibility of the private sector, and the expertise of the 
third sector were stated (DWP 2006; 2008). The Department of Work and Pensions 
(DWP) claimed that ‘these organisations can bring a distinctive approach to service 
delivery, based on their specialist knowledge, experience and skills’ (DWP 2006: 76) 
and that ‘they can also offer more scope for innovation, developing new and creative 
ways of working with customers’ (DWP 2007: 7). The welfare-to-work market was 
also portrayed as a pragmatic and innovative policy that would ensure services were 
provided by a diverse range of organizations best suited to meet the needs of 
jobseekers (DWP 2006). This overarching rhetoric and the activation policy 
parameters surrounding the purpose of welfare-to-work programmes shifted little over 
time. The Conservative/Liberal coalition since 2010 maintained the policy rhetoric 
and continued to emphasize the role of both private sector organizations and TSOs as 
delivery partners.   
 
‘There is a unique opportunity to combine the best of the third sector, 
the voluntary sector and the private sector to reinvigorate our welfare-
to-work system’ (Freud 2010, no page number). 
 
The premise that contractualism was the best option for the provision of employment 
services was not only continued under the new government, but efforts to escalate the 
marketization of welfare services increased (DWP 2006; 2007). This was mainly due 
to experimenting with the contractual arrangements including the introduction of new 
 16 
variations of welfare-to-work programmes targeting specific groups and increasing 
contract sizes. Table 2 outlines a summary of some of the main programmes 
introduced between 1997 and 2010 (for a detailed discussion of the programmes see 
Bennett 2011; Finn 2011; Damm 2012).  
Table 2: Welfare-to-work programmes from 1997-2010 
Phase Programme Institutional 
arrangement 
Providers Features 
1997-
2002 
New Deal 
Programmes; 
Programme Centre 
Employment Service, 
Local Partnerships, 
Jobcentre Plus 
Public partnerships with 
TSOs,  
Small number of invited 
bidders and private sector 
organisations 
Local and city-level 
contracts, 
On-programme payments, 
with some outcome 
payments 
2002-
2010 
Employment Zone 
(EZ); 
Multiple Provider 
EZ; 
Pathways to Work 
DWP contractor, 
Jobcentre Plus 
involvement 
Partnerships remain, but 
increasing competition 
between providers; 
increase in private sector 
organisations  
On-programme payments 
and some payment by 
results 
City-wide and/or small sub-
regional contracts 
2008-
2010 
Flexible New Deal  DWP Multiple 
contractor  (bypasses 
Jobcentre Plus) 
Private and Third Sector 
bidders 
Multi-national 
organisations, 
Medium sized sub-regional 
contracts, 
Larger shift towards 
payment by results, 
Five year contract 
2010- Employment 
Related Service 
Framework (ERSS) 
Work Programme 
Prime Contractor 
(independent 
provider) 
Selected prime contractors 
and preferred bidders 
predominately private 
sector managing complex 
supply chains 
Large regional contracts, 
£20million turnover 
requirement, 
Increased payment by 
results, 
Weighted payments across 
benefit groups, 
Increased scope (inclusion 
of health benefit claimants) 
 
Each new welfare-to-work programme involved a slight (but increasingly market-
based) variation on the contracting process, rewards system and levels of competition. 
Noticeably, the content of the contracts also shifted over time. Whilst the early 
welfare-to-work programmes required contract providers to offer specific support 
mechanisms and meet jobseekers at stipulated stages, in 2008 the prescriptive 
measures outlined within the contracts were reduced. The reduction in regulation was 
based on the assumption that competitive markets based on payment-by-results 
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inclined contractors to provide minimum standards to meet their targets. Increasing 
provider discretion regarding the appropriate support for jobseekers was considered 
the most effective way to create greater innovation in service delivery (Rees et al. 
2013).  
 
Collectively the incremental changes spearheaded by the Labour Government and the 
somewhat larger change pushed forward by the Coalition Government can be 
summarized under four key features: First, a reduction on contract numbers across the 
UK and an associated increase in contract size as regional replaced local contracts. 
Second, the larger contracts were higher in value and over time some increased in 
contract length. Third, a turn towards payments by results and targets including 
competition and provider ‘shift’ whereby numerous contracts were awarded in one 
locality facilitating the loss of market-share for poor performing providers. Fourth, a 
move towards more provider discretion increased flexibility and innovation. 
 
Early welfare-to-work contracts were often secured by public sector partners, 
specially created welfare-to-work organizations, and some TSOs (Bennett 2011; 
Damm 2012). However, by 2007 a range of organizations were involved in the 
welfare-to-work market. This was partly due to an intentional drive by the DWP to 
increase competition and allow new entrants into the market. It was also a reaction by 
private sector organizations to the increasing size and value of the welfare-to-work 
contracts outlined above. Although both TSOs and private sector organizations were 
encouraged to compete for contracts in political statements, the programmes 
increasingly emphasized concepts associated predominately with private sector 
principles such as quantitative performance measurement and profit orientation. For 
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example, provider’s capital and resource levels had ‘to ensure that bidders that 
proceed have sufficient resources to successfully deliver the contract with a minimum 
risk of failure’ and ‘that bidders have a sufficient size to sustain minimum contract 
values and an outcome focussed payment model’ (DWP 2010: 11). Arguably, this 
approach began to favour those organizations with access to large amounts of upfront 
capital, in particular companies funded by private investors (Bennett 2011; 2012). 
 
In the following we will explore the impact of this increasing marketization on TSOs 
delivering primary care and welfare-to-work programmes. 
 
3. Case studies of third sector providers in primary care and welfare-
to-work services  
 
As a result of the changes to the contracting mechanisms for public services described 
in the previous sections, a range of organizations are now involved in the delivery of 
primary care and welfare-to-work programmes in the UK. Some have been registered 
charities, others straightforward private sector organizations with shareholders and 
investors with many different provider forms, including an increasing number of 
hybrid organizations, in-between. As such, it would be difficult to present one single 
organization’s narrative as representative of others and we do not imply that the two 
selected case studies stand for a typical development within the specific policy area in 
which they operate. Instead, both organizations are considered instrumental cases 
(Stake, 1995) of well-known and successful organizations through which a number of 
insights might be gained to illuminate the behaviour and organizational change 
occurring within the general context of marketization of formerly publicly provided 
 19 
services. The value of the instrumental case study does not depend on being able to 
defend the typicality of the case (Stake, 1995: 4), instead the exploratory nature (Yin, 
2003) enables us to critically engage with the aforementioned assumptions of some of 
the theoretical literature and particularly the policy rhetoric about the specific value of 
TSOs in welfare markets. A case study approach instead provides the benefit of ‘thick 
description’ (Geertz, 1973) in a relatively unexplored research area to inform our 
understanding of the impact of markets on provider organizations in different policy 
areas and enables us to reflect on the third sector concept. 
 
The case study of Harmoni, a leading provider in the primary health care market, has 
been chosen as an example of an originally mutual organization owned by its 
members that clearly crossed the contentious boundary to the private sector. It is 
mainly based on publicly available company reports, the company’s website, health 
care practitioner and business magazines as well as data collated under the Freedom 
of Information Act 2000. The Wise Group, in contrast, represents an initially 
successful, but now declining player in the welfare-to-work market that became more 
business-like over time while still firmly remaining in the TSO domain. The data on 
the Wise Group were collected as part of a wider study on organizational change and 
data collection methods included accounts and document analysis, interviews with 
employees and partners, and a short ethnographic period within the organization.  
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3.1. Harmoni – a local GP co-operative turned into a multi-million pound business 
 
Following the new GMS contract in 2004, only around 10 percent of GP practices 
have retained their out-of-hours responsibilities (NHS Commissioning Board 2012). 
As a result of their separation from the routine contractual GP duties, out-of-hours 
care is now provided by a variety of providers, including NHS trusts, local GP co-
operatives, private firms or partnerships between different types of private sector 
organizations. Often formally classified as ‘GP-led’, such companies actually 
resemble more a medium to large-size commercial enterprise than a traditional GP 
practice. The example of Harmoni illustrates this very clearly.  
 
Led by two local doctors, Harmoni (Harrow Medics Out of hours Network Inc) was 
formed in 1996 as a GP co-operative, covering the out-of-hours services for the 
Harrow area in Northwest London. As one of the founding GPs claims, the out-of-
hours coverage arrangement in the area until then had been very inefficient and the 
founding partners had the vision to vastly improve local health care coverage. Within 
18 months of Harmoni’s foundation, GPs from three neighbouring areas had joined 
the Harmoni fleet (Harmoni, 2013). The founding doctors of Harmoni embodied an 
‘entrepreneurial’ spirit amongst GPs that the Department of Health some years later 
pledged to promote. When legislation ended the GP monopoly on NHS primary care, 
Harmoni was therefore well equipped for the new market and enjoyed the advantages 
of a first mover. 
 
The founding members clearly recognized the business potential that the new 
contracts offered and in September 2004 Harmoni became incorporated as a private 
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limited company. This change of legal status became possible as under the APMS 
contract GP services could be provided by ‘any qualified provider’. In 2005, by which 
time it was the largest GP co-operative in the UK with over 600 GP members, 
Harmoni formed a joint venture with a healthcare investment company. Harmoni had 
annual sales growth of 39 per cent since the introduction of the EAPMC in 2008. The 
company almost tripled its workforce over the same period (ECI 2012). In the context 
of the diagnosed vast growth potential of the primary care market due to the 
introduction of the Health and Social Care Act, in November 2012 Harmoni was sold 
off for £48 million to Care UK, one of the largest for-profit health care providers in 
the UK that originally started off as a provider of nursing homes. By that point, 
Harmoni itself had become a leading provider of outsourced healthcare services 
including out-of-hours, GP-led health centres, prison healthcare, telehealth, IT 
services and 12 of the newly introduced NHS 111 emergency call contracts (ECI 
2012). This sell-off of an originally NHS-funded company reportedly turned five GPs 
into millionaires (Ramesh 2012). 
 
The boundary between third sector and business sector had thus clearly been crossed, 
yet the overall picture of the company’s activity remains complex as Harmoni is 
involved in various joint ventures with other GPs and social enterprises and has stakes 
in multiple other companies that have won GP contracts (NHS Support Federation 
2010: 10, see Harmoni’s website at www.harmoni.co.uk for examples of their joint 
ventures and partnerships). For example, in 2009 Harmoni, at that point an 
independent sector company with over 400 GPs as shareholders, formed a social 
enterprise with GPs in Newham. The GPs held 60 per cent of the shares and Harmoni 
the remaining 40 per cent. The company could be classified as a social enterprise in 
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the understanding of the government because its activities were aiming to provide 
services in an ‘under-doctored’ area in which the community had problems accessing 
primary care physicians. The highly complex ownership structure thus makes it 
difficult to track who controls the actual public service and where tax money is going. 
 
Through a number of mergers, acquisitions and partnerships with diverse GP co-
operatives Harmoni to date has become the largest private provider of out-of-hours 
GP care in England with hundreds of contracts across the country. Its company 
structure resembles that of a typical medium-sized enterprise with different executive 
directors, employing agency staff to provide actual front-line services. In this regard, 
it has achieved a good deal of media attention as some of the services were seriously 
under-staffed or only run by nurses (Roberts 2013), causing serious concerns about 
unsafe practices that are very much in contradiction to the ethos on which the original 
co-operative was once founded and that the conceptual literature regards as a defining 
characteristic of the third sector.  
 
3.2. The Wise Group- squeezed out despite substantial organizational change 
 
The Wise Group is a registered charity based in Glasgow founded in 1983. 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s The Wise Group’s activities centred on the provision 
of employment support for the long-term unemployed through the creation of 
temporary employment opportunities predominately in environmental and housing 
regeneration (Bennett 2013). The approach adopted was described as an ‘intermediate 
labour market’ (ILM) model (Finn and Simmonds 2003) and involved a complex 
arrangement of a number of local, regional and national public funding sources. The 
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model was an important part of the organization’s identity and method to reducing 
issues of deprivation and unemployment. 
 
Whilst it has continued to deliver a range of its local, small, specialized employment 
and environmental programmes, its main income from 1999 to 2010 derived from the 
delivery of many of the welfare-to-work programmes outlined in Table 2. The Wise 
Group was one of only a few TSOs which won a large number of welfare-to-work 
contracts between 1998 and 2010 and attracted praise and attention for its work from 
EU funding bodies and local political organizations.  
 
Using income surpluses from welfare-to-work contracts and other employment 
support work (along with third sector capacity development grants) The Wise Group 
underwent a gradual process of internal organizational reforms in order to maintain 
and enhance their involvement in this policy context. Some of the changes were 
instigated directly by the introduction of new contract prerequisites and conditions set 
by the DWP, others were an indirect result of the interaction and competition with 
other organizations in the market (Bennett 2013).  
 
One of the notable changes was a shift in employment support provision. In the earlier 
welfare-to-work programmes individuals within the organization connected the 
delivery of New Deal programmes with their traditional activities. Over time this 
approach was no longer facilitated due to the contract requirements and eligibility 
rules. Furthermore, there was an increasing need to move individuals more quickly 
into the labour market making extended periods of support and temporary 
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employment impossible. This led to a shift away from the ILM model and the 
organization’s core activities towards a more typical work-first delivery approach.   
 
As the organization continued to deliver welfare-to-work contracts quite separately 
from its other employment support activities, a number of organizational changes 
were introduced in direct response to DWP requirements. First, The Wise Group 
developed a series of audit and data recording systems to meet the basic requirements 
of DWP contracting. Second, a number of internal departmental changes were 
introduced, including the professionalization of contract bidding and an increased 
emphasis on meeting targets throughout the organization (not limited to welfare-to-
work contracting). This also involved an increase in the number of permanent staff 
(from 265 in 1996 to 516 by 2010) and in increase in total income of £8.5 million in 
1996 to £32.1million by 2010.  
 
According to an anonymous respondent from the organization the aim was to portray 
The Wise Group as a ‘leading welfare-to-work organization’, namely as a large, 
professional business, capable of delivering the new bigger contracts. For a time this 
appears to have been a successful approach. In 2010 The Wise Group was the only 
TSO of the nine organizations accepted onto the Scotland ‘lot’ of the Coalition 
government’s framework for the pre-tendering phase of the Work Programme. The 
framework required potential contractors to pass a series of organizational 
assessments, one of which was to demonstrate an annual turnover of £20m (which the 
DWP claimed would reduce the risks connected to taking over large value contracts). 
Of the 128 organizations which made it onto the framework across the UK, only 23 
were non-private sector organizations (Bennett 2011).  
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Although The Wise Group remained operational in some of its traditional work areas, 
in many aspects it adopted systems similar to other providers in the welfare-to-work 
market. Arguably, this organizational change was necessary in order to gain contract 
success and therefore guarantee survival in the changing market. However, despite 
The Wise Group’s organizational change and contract success from 1997-2010, the 
introduction of the Work Programme increased the risk for providers by introducing a 
finance model which required organizations to invest their own money in service 
delivery first and receive income only at a later date (Bennett 2011; Finn 2011; Rees 
et al 2013). It appears that the changes were significant enough to diminish the 
competitiveness of The Wise Group as two private sector organizations secured the 
Scotland contract. Where once it was a leading regional provider of welfare-to-work 
services and a showcase example of a TSO successfully competing against private 
sector organizations, it has since undergone a large down-sizing process, reducing 
staff numbers and investment. Despite its transition to become more ‘business-like,’ 
by the end of 2010 The Wise Group’s involvement was much reduced and its role as a 
major contributor of innovative employment support had diminished. 
 
Discussion 
 
Our analyses of the developing markets in primary care and welfare-to-work have 
shown that the general enthusiasm of subsequent UK governments for public service 
provision by the third sector has been translated into concrete reforms of different 
policy areas by breaking up former public sector monopolies. Just like the previous 
Labour governments, the current Coalition government has been supporting 
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entrepreneurship in the form of TSOs, and more specifically, social enterprises and 
mutuals and claims to be looking ‘beyond the old binary choice of monolithic 
monopolistic state provision or full-blooded commercial outsourcing – and embracing 
a new range of models which can happily coexist in the space that lies in between’ 
(Maude 2014; no page number). In doing so, it continues to promote the outsourcing 
of public services. However, the development of the contracting processes created 
similar welfare markets in which also independent providers competed for 
increasingly large and lucrative contracts.  
 
Indeed, as other research has shown, in neither welfare market was it TSOs – even if 
defined widely and including profit-seeking social enterprises – that seemed to have 
benefitted the most from the new market opportunities. It was mainly larger 
commercial entities that won most of the tenders (Heins et al. 2009; NHS Support 
Federation 2010; Rees 2013). In the context of procurement regulations that 
emphasize size, long-term business strategies or value-for-money that providers need 
to offer, only those TSOs that to a large extent mimicked the behaviour of for-profit 
business remained competitive. This trend known as isomorphism has been widely 
discussed and evidenced in the non-profit literature (e.g. Currie et al. 2003; Heins et 
al. 2010; Rees et al. 2012). This should not be surprising - even if they are notionally 
‘third sector’, social enterprises have to generate most of their income from 
competing in markets and thus cannot avoid adapting to the rules of the market. 
Ironically, there is an inherent contradiction between the simultaneous government 
policies of rewarding good performance and prescribing certain capacity levels of 
providers (being conducive to the building of oligopolies) and promoting provider 
diversity (to ensure competition).  
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Westall (2009: 12) asked why the crossing of boundaries by third sector groups and 
the shifting of motivations and goals within organizations happens. We can give some 
tentative answers to such questions on the basis of our analysis: The very introduction 
of market mechanisms exerts adaptive pressures on providers trying to compete in 
these new welfare markets. In our first case study, this led to a conversion of a 
formerly employee-owned co-operative to a fairly large-scale commercial company 
over time. In our second case study, it caused a traditional local TSO to change 
towards a more business-like style while officially not redeeming its status of a 
charity. However, this legal status and character made it difficult, if not impossible, to 
survive in the market once the contracting rules became even more business-oriented 
than before. It is thus no surprise that despite the government claiming they would 
provide a ‘level playing field’ for the third sector, empirical evidence of the success of 
the sector in tendering for primary care and welfare-to-work provision to date has 
been scarce. 
 
We demonstrated that not only has there been a shift in the types of organizations 
involved in the new welfare markets, but within some of these organizations there has 
been much change in terms of their characteristics and structures. Similarly to Aiken 
and Bode (2009: 220), who claimed that such policies are “killing the golden goose”, 
we find that the changes erode the distinctiveness of TSOs and their alleged strengths. 
Regarding the example of The Wise Group, it remained a charity, but sought to 
discourage being perceived as one and portrayed itself as a social enterprise and thus 
as more business-like (through highlighting its strengths in contract management, 
employment knowledge and innovation). Internally, it emphasized meeting targets 
and adopted business planning strategies more akin to private sector organizations. 
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The example of Harmoni has demonstrated that it becomes difficult to speak of any 
alleged social enterprise distinctiveness and that there is a strong trend towards full 
conversion to commerciality.  
 
Involvement in the emerging UK welfare markets is therefore not simply about 
competing for a contract and delivering a front-line service on behalf of the public 
sector. It requires organizational adaptation and the competitive and regulatory 
pressures of the market meant that the contracting process controlled both the services 
delivered and the behaviour of providers, regardless of their original sector, 
organizational history and ethos. The two organizations that we selected for 
illustration were praised for what they were doing, but now no longer represent the 
local, innovative TSOs with ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ they were supposed to be. Their 
vastly different experiences challenge a simplified third sector ideal with a crisp 
boundary to the private sector and highlight that policy-makers’ assumptions about 
what will happen if we bring in the third sector as welfare providers were rather naïve 
in the context of an increasingly competitive environment characterized by minimum 
contract values, efficiency, take-overs and mergers favouring large-scale 
organisations. 
Our findings confirm previous research as the two case studies demonstrate the 
hybridization of the third sector as well as the diversification and metamorphosis of 
individual entities within the sector which Brandsen et al. (2005) regard as essential to 
understanding third sector involvement in welfare markets. By tracing organizational 
change in two instrumental cases we go further than the existing literature by 
demonstrating that there are contradictions between policy intentions and practice 
outcomes and that such incongruity could be attributed to the lack of recognition of 
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issues of hybridity and change by policy makers and an oversimplified understanding 
of the role of the third sector in welfare markets. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We used two policy areas to analyze how the general context of a trend towards 
marketization plays out in two different welfare areas in order to show how general 
government guidance coming from the Cabinet Office and the Treasury plays out ‘on 
the ground’. While there are differences in detail (e.g. the specific problems that led to 
the use of non-public sector providers), the comparison highlights striking similarities 
about the claims being made about the value of the third sector and the general 
direction of development that puts a lot of pressure on TSOs to transform (or vanish).  
 
As we have shown, both the primary care and welfare-to-work markets are complex 
and characterized by an increasing hybridity of organizations and fuzziness of the 
boundaries between sectors. This stands in contrast to the commendations of TSOs by 
policy makers and some of the theoretical literature as being  distinct market 
providers that combine the best of the public and the private sector with the potential 
to simultaneously address concerns of both market and government failure. The 
changes in welfare provision since public sector monopolies were ended are as 
multifaceted as the individual organizations and their adaptations over time.  
 
Detailed longitudinal studies of organizations are essential in the advancement of the 
discussion of the third sector concept as they provide conceptual insights into 
organizational change and behaviour. Drawing on instrumental case studies from two 
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highly marketized public policy areas we contend that policy intentions and practice 
outcomes are contradictory. Rather than overcoming problems of market failure, the 
third sector has failed (albeit in very different ways) in the market as the insights into 
the realities of two of the (previously) most successful TSOs have revealed. If not 
even ‘poster children’ of the third sector are confirming to the TSO ideal, then who 
does? This beckons the question as to why the narrow understanding of the third 
sector continues to be promoted by advocates for the creation of welfare markets and 
increased public service outsourcing. 
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Table 1: Primary care market reforms 1998-2013 
Phase Reform Key change Providers Features 
1997-
2003 
Primary  Care Act 
1997  
Introduction of 
Personal Medical 
Services (PMS) 
NHS 
providers  
Locally agreed alternative to 
General Medical Service for 
specific populations 
2004-
2007 
New General 
Medical Services 
(GMS) Contract 
Fragmentation of 
range of services 
to be offered by 
GPs and 
introduction of 
new contract 
forms (PCTMS, 
APMS) in 
addition to GMS 
and PMS 
NHS GPs and 
non-NHS 
‘Alternative 
Providers’    
APMS provides the 
opportunity for locally 
negotiated contracts with 
non-NHS bodies, such as 
voluntary or commercial 
sector providers (or with 
GMS/PMS practices) to 
supply enhanced and 
additional primary medical 
services 
2008-
2010 
Equitable Access to 
Primary Care 
Introduction of at 
least 100 new 
general practices 
in the 25% of 
areas with the 
poorest provision 
and 151 GP-led 
health centres 
NHS GPs and 
non-NHS 
providers 
APMS as the recommended 
contracting route, boosting 
private sector providers 
2010- Health and Social 
Care Bill [Health 
and Social Care Act 
2012] 
All GP contracts 
decided by 
competitive 
tendering process. 
GPs gaining 
control over 
commissioning of 
non-primary care 
services 
‘Any willing 
provider’ 
(later on ‘any 
qualified 
provider’) 
Break-up of former nationally 
standardised GMS. Increased 
choice for patients and 
competition amongst 
providers. 
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Table 2: Welfare-to-work programmes from 1997-2010 
Phase Programme Institutional 
arrangement 
Providers Features 
1997-
2002 
New Deal 
Programmes; 
Programme Centre 
Employment Service, 
Local Partnerships, 
Jobcentre Plus 
Public partnerships with 
TSOs,  
Small number of invited 
bidders and private sector 
organisations 
Local and city-level 
contracts, 
On-programme payments, 
with some outcome 
payments 
2002-
2010 
Employment Zone 
(EZ); 
Multiple Provider 
EZ; 
Pathways to Work 
DWP contractor, 
Jobcentre Plus 
involvement 
Partnerships remain, but 
increasing competition 
between providers; 
increase in private sector 
organisations  
On-programme payments 
and some payment by 
results 
City-wide and/or small sub-
regional contracts 
2008-
2010 
Flexible New Deal  DWP Multiple 
contractor  (bypasses 
Jobcentre Plus) 
Private and Third Sector 
bidders 
Multi-national 
organisations, 
Medium sized sub-regional 
contracts, 
Larger shift towards 
payment by results, 
Five year contract 
2010- Employment 
Related Service 
Framework (ERSS) 
Work Programme 
Prime Contractor 
(independent 
provider) 
Selected prime contractors 
and preferred bidders 
predominately private 
sector managing complex 
supply chains 
Large regional contracts, 
£20million turnover 
requirement, 
Increased payment by 
results, 
Weighted payments across 
benefit groups, 
Increased scope (inclusion 
of health benefit claimants) 
 
